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Abstract 
This paper dissects the role of emergency food aid during the current Syrian conflict.  
 Drawing on Autesserre’s concept of frames and Agamben’s theory of sovereignty, we 
argue that the neutrality frame, which undergirds the majority of humanitarian relief 
efforts in Syria, obfuscates emergency food aid’s impact, both on sovereign power 
relations and local political dynamics. Through close scrutiny of various case studies, we 
trace how humanitarian efforts reinforce the bases of sovereign politics while 
contributing to a host of what Pandolfi (1998) terms “mobile sovereignties.” We then 
analyze how and why ostensibly neutral emergency food aid has unintentionally assisted 
the Assad regime by facilitating its control over food, which it uses to buttress support 
and foster compliance. The article concludes by examining the political and military 
impact of emergency food aid during Syria’s war before discussing possible implications 
for the humanitarian enterprise more broadly. 
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Emergency food aid is most often depicted as the compassionate response of the 
international community to natural disasters and ‘complex emergencies.’ In popular 
discourse, humanitarian relief efforts are regarded as benevolent and benign practices that 
seek to improve the lot of the distressed. Scholars and students of humanitarian aid 
during wartime have problematized this narrative, as well as the alleged outcomes that 
help legitimize its manifestations. Some have argued that humanitarian assistance, 
through its diversion, larceny or misallocation, can strengthen the position of warring 
parties.
1
 Others have described how the strategic inter-linking of aid and external 
intervention can serve foreign policy objectives or neoliberal agendas.
2
 In situations 
deemed less geopolitically significant, aid distribution is said to have encouraged—even 
legitimized—international political inaction.3 During the Syrian conflict, emergency food 
distributions have had an array of unintended consequences. Paradoxically, aid has 
accomplished exactly the opposite of what its proponents and distributors, at least in 
public, claim. Despite pretensions to neutrality, our observations and analysis suggest that 
foodstuffs distributed by UN agencies and most humanitarian organizations have 
contributed to iterations of sovereignty and political outcomes at odds with their own 
neutral aspirations. 
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 Why has this been the case? How has humanitarian aid become enmeshed in 
sovereignty and politics when it seeks to avoid these arenas categorically? Aspirations to 
neutrality and practices claiming to uphold this principle help explain much of the story.
4
 
Although ostensibly non-governmental, humanitarian organizations came to be perceived 
as extensions of Western agendas while working in conjunction with occupation forces in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
5
 Many groups became absorbed in a web of mutual interests and 
overlapping objectives with donor states, recipient governments and military forces.
6
 
Partially as a result of these negative experiences, UN aid agencies and various 
humanitarian groups have re-embraced the language of neutrality that predominated 
during the Cold War period and early 1990s. Organizational interests are also critical to 
neutrality’s re-emergence. The need to appeal to donors and secure funding is a 
permanent concern.
7
 What was initially perceived to be a weakness in humanitarian 
operations—the lack of engagement with local political processes as well as their 
inability to address the fundamental concerns undergirding conflict—has become a 
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strength for many foreign patrons.
8
 Emergency food aid is increasingly seen as a less 
forceful—or more benevolent—form of intervention, one that tacitly avoids the 
complexities of military and diplomatic engagement. Given the geopolitical 
disagreements surrounding the Syrian conflict, most donors fund food aid only if 
aid groups present themselves as working outside the political sphere. With the 
exception of ICRC and the few others who never abandoned their Dunantist principles 
and aspirations,
9
 the renewed embrace of the language of neutrality by the UN and the 
largest humanitarian organizations operating in Syria
10
 has been as enthusiastic as 
the previous accommodation with military interventions and the reconstruction of ‘failed 
states.’11 The results in Syria have been less controversial but equally significant. 
We use the term humanitarian organization or group to denote collectively those 
bodies and agencies that claim to operate according to the tenets of international 
humanitarian law from which they derive universal principles of humanitarian action so 
as to assist beneficiaries. Although most humanitarian actors consider themselves to be 
neutral, their understandings of the term vary considerably.
12
 To counter the profusion of 
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these differences, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
compiled a set of “Principles of Humanitarian Action” in 2010 to guide the work of relief 
agencies in conflict situations.
13
 Along with humanity, impartiality and independence, 
neutrality stands as one of the four key principles underpinning humanitarian action.  For 
OCHA, neutrality entails that “humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or 
engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.”14  OCHA 
conceptualizes neutrality as both as an incontrovertible moral principle and a pragmatic 
operational posture—which ostensibly allows humanitarian actors to gain access to 
vulnerable individuals without undue interference in their operations. Although working 
under separate legal mandates, the ICRC and Syrian Red Crescent (SARC), two of the 
largest international and local humanitarian organizations operating in Syria, have 
espoused positions similar to OCHA’s precepts during the conflict.15 Notwithstanding the 
ICRC’s unique legal standing and its emphasis on neutrality as an operational imperative 
rather than a political norm, the group’s food relief efforts in Syria have not aligned with 
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this distinction. Similar to other humanitarian groups, the organization presents itself as 
external to politics, bereft of power, and ethically chaste. 
The vast majority of food aid distributed in Syria between 2012 and 2015 has 
been undergirded by what we call the ‘frame’ of neutrality. While seemingly benign, this 
‘frame’—defined as the collective, intersubjective understandings “people ‘draw on’ to 
construct roles and interpret objects”—has had a tangible impact.16 It defines and maps 
social reality in powerful ways. Shared by key international and local humanitarian 
organizations as well as UN aid agencies, neutrality has shaped not only their 
understanding of the Syrian conflict, but also structured their interventions through the 
constraints, interests and approaches it constructs and promotes. This frame allows 
humanitarian practices to stand above and beyond the debates of ordinary politics. Aid 
workers we interviewed distinguished political intent, which they criticized, from 
political impact, which they hesitatingly, if at all, recognized. While advocates of 
neutrality as an operational principle claim that the concept is a crucial part of 
humanitarian aid’s effectiveness, our observations suggest that proceeding as if 
emergency food aid had no impact on a war’s outcome has far graver consequences. At 
the very least, it obscures aid’s political-military impact and conceals involvement in the 
exercise of power.
17
  
We begin by outlining the history and development of food-related welfare 
programs in Syria before describing how emergency food aid has become politicized 
through its intersection with these practices. We then discuss the concept of frames, 
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before applying it to the principle of neutrality that underpins most relief efforts. 
Following a brief discussion of Agamben’s conception of sovereignty, we go on to assess 
the role food aid has played in sovereign power relations during the Syrian war. We 
theorize sovereignty as a necessarily tentative, always emergent and continually 
(re)produced political order, before illustrating how emergency food assistance has 
produced what Pandolfi terms “mobile sovereignties.”18 The article then analyzes the 
political and military impact of emergency food aid on the country’s war through various 
cases-studies. We argue that the neutrality frame obfuscates its impact, both on 
sovereignty and on politics. Pretending otherwise has aided the Assad regime by giving it 
increased control over food, which it uses to buttress support and foster compliance. We 
conclude with a brief summary of our arguments before contemplating the potential 
implications of the neutrality frame, and the practices it legitimizes, for emergency food 
aid and the Syrian conflict. Our analysis draws on more than 100 in-depth interviews 
with aid workers, local volunteers and Syrian stakeholders conducted during a twenty-
four month period between 2013 and 2015. Almost all our contacts inside the country 
asked to remain anonymous in view of the personal and professional risks involved in 
providing information on the sensitive topics we discussed. Due to these constraints, we 
use pseudonyms and only fully reference data obtained through public sources and on-
the-record interviews. Information and anonymous quotes that are not fully referenced 
come from confidential interviews and participant observation. To bolster our claims, we 
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complement our findings with those of various reputable news sources. Undoubtedly, 
several lacunae remain and further research is urgently needed. 
Welfare and the Politics of Food 
Provision of subsidized food to Syrians was the result of tacit socio-political 
agreements between ruling authorities and civilians. Government intervention in food 
distribution expanded with the British-led establishment of the Middle East Supply 
Centre (MESC) in 1940. Allied forces could ill afford an expansion of food riots seen in 
Cairo, Beirut and Damascus after the onset of conflict in Europe.  Within a year, the 
MESC’s reach extended into almost every facet of Middle Eastern life.19 Under the 
auspices of the Spears Mission,
20
 an agency known as the Wheat and Cereals Office 
created an integrated system of grain collection, transport and distribution that prefigured 
the apparatus of food distribution instituted by leaders of post-war Syria.
21
 After the 
conflict, consumers became co-producers in systems of welfare provision, demanding 
from political authorities similar forms of support to those that had been provided during 
World War II. These included subsidies on basic foodstuffs to assist urban consumers and 
on agricultural inputs to help rural producers, many of which were adopted and expanded 
by subsequent Ba‘thist governments (1963-  ).22 Despite the gradual and largely failed 
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liberalization of Syria’s economy over the past two decades,23 the legacies of the Ba‘th 
Party’s state-led development model persisted through various welfare policies aimed at 
ensuring food security. The most prominent and long-lasting example was the 
government’s subsidy of khubz ‘arabi (Arabic bread). This and other welfare programs 
helped ensure modest levels of sustenance and proved crucial to minimizing public unrest 
and fostering loyalty to the Assad-led regime throughout the last forty years. Why so? 
Welfare—defined as the direct distribution or indirect facilitation of services, programs 
and infrastructure intended to promote the wellbeing and security of recipients— can 
foster good will, establish a reputation of reliability and signal a desire and capacity to 
govern successfully.
24
 Providing services helps build community, signals membership in 
a polity while offering material security and psychological comfort to beneficiaries. In 
brief, welfare provision is political. If this is true during peacetime, welfare’s importance 
is heightened during war, when the contingent nature of state authority and its corollaries 
become increasingly overt.  
Unsurprisingly, Syria’s conflict has dramatically altered peacetime welfare 
arrangements. For example, the General Establishment for Cereal Processing and Trade 
(HOBOOB)—an agency of the Syrian Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade responsible 
for wheat procurement, flour milling and timely bread distribution—has had to alter its 
strategies in response to damaged wheat silos, destroyed flourmills, poor harvests, 
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transportation impediments and military operations.
25
 Flourmills and bakeries throughout 
the country are either closed or operating far below capacity.
26
 Notwithstanding these 
pressures, the Syrian government has done its best to maintain food supplies and the 
bread subsidy in areas it controls. In addition, countless rebel groups—each with their 
own agenda—have established informal social pacts with the people they govern, 
offering an array of welfare services to generate popular support or acquiescence. 
Humanitarian assistance, due to its overlap with welfare practices, is closely imbricated 
in these processes.  
Emergency food aid’s impact lies not only in these intangible dimensions, but 
also in the very real resources it provides in a context characterized by scarcity.  When 
compared to the Assad regime’s expenditures on subsidies, the amount of food 
distributed by humanitarian organizations is noteworthy (see Tables 1 and 2).
27
 In 2014, 
donor-pooled funds managed by OCHA provided food assistance to an average of 4.43 
million people each month.
28
  In 2015, the UN, ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent 
(SARC) expect to support 8.7 million civilians in Syria with food assistance.
29
 Given the 
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size and scope of this intervention, how food distributions are organized and allocated 
becomes a crucial question.  Although some independent aid organizations operate in 
Syria on their own accord, the largest international organizations involved in relief efforts 
rely almost exclusively on Syrian partner agencies to deliver food aid. The WFP, the 
largest UN operational agency organizing aid inside of Syria, and the ICRC, depend 
heavily on SARC and 27 government-approved NGOs to reach areas they cannot access 
due to security concerns and restrictions most often placed on them by the Syrian 
government. Oversight on these distributions has been limited.
30
 Since the dramatic 
escalation of humanitarian aid efforts in September 2012 [from 540,000 people a month 
in July to 1.5 million
31
] and again in early 2013 [to 2.5 million],
32
 most food distributions 
have been conducted through government-approved channels. Despite the political 
preferences of the largest country donors and neutral aspirations of humanitarian 
organizations, emergency food aid—organized through UN agencies and distributed by 
local partners—has consistently benefitted the Assad regime.33  
The UN has repeatedly documented how the Syrian government blocks the 
delivery of food aid to civilians. It does so through bureaucratic restrictions that seek to 
ensure that external resources assist the regime rather than opposition forces or those 
                                                 
30
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under their control.
34
 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s March 2014 report to the 
UNSC noted how the regime’s “lack of internal communication…result[s] in denial of 
access or delays,” which impede the entrance of aid into opposition-controlled areas.35 
UN efforts to mitigate the Syrian government’s influence over such distributions 
eventually prompted the UNSC to bypass it. In July 2014, citing the fact that “previous 
demands for aid access had not been heeded,” the UNSC passed Resolution 2165 
authorizing cross-border aid deliveries from Turkey and Jordan without the consent of the 
Syrian government.
36
 This suggests that access was previously being withheld for less 
than genuine security concerns. Despite UNSC Resolution 2165, the WFP’s fear that the 
regime will cut off access to the civilians it already reaches—mainly in regime-held 
territories but also in areas besieged by government forces—has limited the scale of its 
cross-border deliveries.
37
 As one external evaluation of the WFP put it, “management 
confirmed that they judged that its interests in delivering food to the maximum number of 
people in need are best served by maintaining close relations with the Syrian government 
and negotiating behind the scenes over access.”38 As a result, assistance has been 
concentrated in government-held areas, while other parts of the country are deemed 
‘inaccessible’ or ‘hard to reach’ so as not to compromise claims to neutrality. Of the two 
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million civilians in rebel-controlled areas the UN estimated it could assist after passing of 
UNSC Resolution 2165, food aid reached only 200,000 by the end of 2014.
39
  
Throughout the conflict, the regime has succeeded in pressuring humanitarian 
organizations to funnel food through its preferred channels. For Nigel Pont, Mercy Corps 
Regional Director for the Middle East, “The unmet needs remain huge—between the UN 
and NGO efforts, tens of thousands of civilians inside Syria are still not being reached.”40 
Unsurprisingly, emergency food aid has had tangible consequences on military 
developments and the lives of civilians. Many of these are linked to the frame that 
underpins aid distribution.  
The Frame of Neutrality: Obfuscations and Repercussions  
Principles and practices of neutrality lie at the heart of the vast majority of 
humanitarian relief efforts in Syria. We dissect the principle of neutrality and its 
repercussions through the concept of ‘frames.’ Following Auteserre, we understand 
frames as a mechanism by which individuals and organizations categorize knowledge and 
interpret it.
41
 They are social objects that are embedded in routines, practices, discourses 
and technologies, as well as institutions. They can include ideologies, paradigms and 
shared definitions of particular environments.
42
 Frames neither pre-exist action nor 
respond solely to practice. Instead, they emerge from a dialectic relationship between 
discourse and experience, which are irreducible and fundamentally interconnected. One 
of the most relevant characteristics of frames is their ability to mold views of what is 
considered a problem, or a solution, by organizing and interpreting information in 
                                                 
39
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specific ways.
43
 For example, if the neutrality frame underlies humanitarian aid efforts, 
distributions will be considered apolitical and their engrossment in political processes 
avoidable.  
The WFP has been adamant in its adherence to the principle of neutrality during 
the Syria conflict. “Our work with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and over a dozen local 
partners inside Syria is strictly humanitarian and beyond any political considerations,” 
stated Mathew Hollingworth, the WFP’s country director in Syria.44 “As a neutral party 
to any conflict our goal is simple: to deliver food assistance to the whole of Syria, 
reaching anyone who needs it, regardless of where they are located,” he said. The ICRC 
in Damascus espouses a similar stance: “Our core principles are impartiality, neutrality 
and independence, which means we want to help anyone who is vulnerable, in need or 
directly affected by the fighting.”45 When pressed on the possible co-optation of aid by 
the Syrian government, spokespeople and volunteers refused to countenance neutrality’s 
inadvertent corollaries. None of the SARC or ICRC interviewees wished to respond to 
accusations of SARC’s close relationship with the Assad regime.46 The personal relations 
between state elites, SARC President Abdur Rahman Attar and other members of senior 
management were consistently denied or downplayed by ‘neutral’ aid workers. In 
contrast, a number of activist groups and members of Syrian civil society contest the 
neutrality frame’s impact on aid efforts. For Abdulrahman Omar, a pediatrician from 
Hama who oversees primary health care centers for the Union of Syrian Medical Relief 
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Organizations, “The world is either ignorant or ignoring the issue that the Red Crescent 
in our country is political and has an agenda.” He stated explicitly what most relief 
workers interviewed preferred not to admit, “The Red Crescent in Syria is the 
government.”47 This may not reflect the political preferences of SARC volunteers, who 
predominantly come from the local communities in which they work; yet at the level of 
executives who make sensitive funding and distribution decisions, the ties are well 
documented.
48
 One recently returned WFP employee, who requested anonymity, outlined 
some of the compromises made ‘on the ground’: “Most aid is still subject to strict control 
measures by the government, who also requests that it be distributed through state-
approved bodies such as SARC. I believe the government closely oversees if not 
completely controls these organizations.”49 
Opposition activists, critical NGOs and prominent members of Syrian civil 
society have similarly described how aid supplies are vetted and controlled by 
administrative and military networks linked to the Assad regime. Islam Halabi, a Mercy 
Corps employee based in Aleppo, described what he saw when visiting an IDP-camp in 
government-controlled shelters near the University of Aleppo, “Unfortunately, the aid 
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supplies going to regime areas are distributed to army members, Shabiha [pro-regime 
militias] and their followers. The aid does not reach those in need, other than young 
women.”50 In another interview, a pro-opposition activist in the western town of Al-
Qusayr stated that, “Following the attacks of June 2013 when the Syrian army regained 
control of the city, I saw various soldiers distributing World Food Programme packages 
to local residents.”51 When rebel forces won control of government headquarters in Idlib 
province in 2015, they found Red Cross, Red Crescent and UN food packages in the 
offices of pro-regime forces.
52
 “Look at how the UN helps the regime. These aid 
containers are inside the [regime base] and the UN’s name is written on them,” said a 
civilian in Jisr a-Shagour city. “Our children are dying from starvation and the regime 
forces destroy the bread [while keeping food aid for themselves].”53 For Najib Ghadbian, 
the representative of the opposition Syrian National Coalition at the UN, the international 
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body’s failure to increase assistance to opposition-controlled territories “amounts to 
preferential treatment for regime-held areas and perpetuates the regime’s starvation 
tactics and empowers the regime to continue to use food and medicine as a weapon of 
war.”54  
These dynamics are hardly unique to Syria—the history of food aid during 
‘complex emergencies’ is littered with cases in which opposition forces and state 
authorities co-opt humanitarian aid for their own benefit.
55
 Yet the neutrality frame 
preempts discussion of these developments. In their responses to our queries, aid workers 
reiterated the (non)political attitudes we encountered in the official statements and 
documents of the largest humanitarian organizations operating in Syria. Although 
critiques of relief efforts varied and off-the-record comments displayed interesting 
discrepancies, all the aid workers that we interviewed shared similar ideas regarding the 
role of emergency food aid. Their neutral intentions precluded the politicization of 
assistance. Political disputes, combat operations and misappropriation of supplies by 
military forces were described as part and parcel of everyday concerns. Navigating these 
obstacles tactfully was deemed important, yet the role of aid itself in these arenas was 
never explicitly recognized or deemed problematic. Relief efforts were restricted to 
saving lives according to the principal of neutrality that individual aid workers espoused, 
and their organizations defended. Even the passage of UNSC Resolution 2165 and its 
successor UNSC Resolution 2191 did not lead to lasting changes to the neutrality frame 
guiding relief efforts. Rather, they contributed to a few high-profile projects and minor 
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adjustments in techniques of distribution. UN agencies and international aid 
organizations carefully adapted their efforts to accommodate constraints ‘from above’ 
and exigencies ‘on the ground.’ In the process, emergency food aid’s power lies 
obscured.  
Bare Life and the Exception: Sovereign Assemblages in Wartime Syria  
“Syria is not only a killing field…it is also a testing ground for competing types of state 
sovereignty”56 
 
The neutrality frame reinforces the bases of sovereign politics while obscuring 
emergency food aid’s impact on sovereign power relations. We conceive of sovereignty 
not as a container concept but as a specific “political order produced by an assemblage of 
administrative strategies,”57 performed and planned to generate allegiance, fear and 
legitimacy from the household to the highest echelons of institutional power.
58
 By 
abandoning sovereignty as an ontological ground of power or order and instead 
theorizing it as always and necessarily tentative—emergent and constantly shifting—we 
can more fully grasp its iterations during the Syrian conflict. During the war, sovereign 
power relations have been contested, re-arranged and transformed on a daily basis. In 
practice, sovereignty is often shared or contested between an array of humanitarian 
organizations, the Assad regime and its various rivals, producing a field of contingent or 
mobile sovereignties that differentiate populations and subject them to varied forms of 
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rule and citizenship. These sometimes contradictory and frequently mobile assemblages 
result in varied and contingent forms of order and authority. Of course, “sovereignty 
persists”—it has not disappeared—yet it does so amidst an intensification of ambiguities 
and uncertainties that have inhabited its operation all along.
59
 
Building upon Schmidt, Agamben defines sovereign power not “as the monopoly 
to coerce or rule, but as the monopoly to decide.”60  He argues that the suspension of the 
rule of law in the state of exception underpins the modern legal and political order. The 
decision over the exception defines who the sovereign is and delineates its position both 
“outside and inside the juridical order,” part of the legal order, but also able to suspend 
it.
61
 This state, called upon in moments of emergency so as to invest one government or 
individual with authority beyond the law, can work to deprive civilians of their 
citizenship rights. Through the state of exception, the sovereign separates two forms of 
life: citizens included in a juridical order and those stripped of juridical-political 
protections, a separation between life that is politically qualified, and one that is “bare” or 
naked.
62
 Despite its utility for theorizing the establishment and foundations of sovereign 
authority, to pose a simple opposition between normalized citizenship and bare life, as 
some of Agamben’s readers have done, reduces the complexity and ambiguity that occurs 
during war. Humanitarian organizations, local militias and political activists may contest 
and problematize the state of exception so as to legitimize particular actions or practices 
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through which laws are suspended and populations managed. As Agamben explains, the 
exception “does not limit itself to distinguishing what is inside from what is outside but 
instead traces a threshold (the state of exception) between the two on the basis of which 
outside and inside—the normal situation and chaos—enter into those complex 
topological relationships.”63 Rather than reprising debates over Agamben’s applicability 
to humanitarian spaces or conflict situations, we are better served by an empirically 
informed approach that eschews a dichotomous reading of his theory of sovereignty.  
Despite humanitarian organizations’ disinterest in issues of authority, order and 
legitimacy, the neutrality frame imbricates them in sovereign power relations in two 
different ways. First, aid groups reproduce the bases of sovereign politics by constructing 
a particular form of subject: individuals who are merely lives to be saved rather than 
political voices to be considered—Agamben’s “bare life.”64 By emphasizing the 
alleviation of physical distress and deprivation, aid recipients are imagined as “pure 
victims.”65 Those receiving assistance are valued strictly in terms of their biological life, 
not their political voice; life alone—bereft of meaning or complexity—is what matters, 
not the continuance of a particular way of life.
66
 Emergency food distribution becomes 
the only logical response to their suffering. This conceptualization of the human as 
individual—thoroughly embedded in modernity’s episteme—disembeds people from 
kinship, community and religion in favor of an ethical universalism that one author calls 
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“the secular religion of the new millennium.”67 It replaces ties amongst people with the 
idea of equivalence amongst strangers. In the process, suffering is depoliticized, as 
humanitarian ethics turns a political problem into an affective one.
68
 By viewing aid as a 
neutral response to a crisis and conceptualizing recipients as victims to be given 
sustenance, the WFP, the ICRC and their implementing partners reaffirm ‘bare life.’  
This reaffirmation of ‘bare life’ also relies on a temporal disruption. Official 
documents from UN aid agencies describe the deprivation of Syrians as the product of a 
‘complex emergency’—a term developed in the 1990’s to label major humanitarian 
crises—despite the ongoing nature of the conflict.69 Emergencies are sudden and 
unpredictable; the urgency of the term drives those concerned to focus on people 
entrapped by the emergency’s conditions rather than examine the circumstances that 
produce them. This allows humanitarian organizations to point to what is happening, but 
without reference to agency or politics. This view of wartime dehistoricizes the lives of 
Syrians—it cannot explain or understand how and why people have become dependent 
on humanitarian assistance.
70
 This limits the capacity of humanitarians to proactively 
address sensitive situations before they degenerate.
71
 Remedies come not from politics 
but new technologies and more efficient distribution methods. By disconnecting aid 
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recipients from the historically specific circumstances that produces their need, 
emergency food aid is technologized and depoliticized. Information demanded by aid 
agencies prioritizes consequences rather than causes, nutritional deficits rather than 
strategies of starvation, needs rather than grievances, flows of grain instead of flows of 
power. Success is measured not by how interventions alter hunger-producing conditions, 
but by targeted technical objectives that quantify recipients reached. This obscures 
fundamental questions such as who is kept alive and who has rights to food, subsistence 
and survival. The neutrality frame, and the concept of complex emergency that functions 
as its temporal scaffolding, results in relief efforts that reduce politics to the art of 
survival and the distribution of resources to a morally vindicated science of allocation.
72
 
Second, UN agencies and programs operating in Syria have also taken on 
important sovereign attributes. By creating the categories of people in need of assistance 
and by virtue of their (in)capacity to move supplies to certain territories rather than 
others, humanitarian organizations take part in decisions over human survival. In 
determining what groups of people are ‘at risk’—a category that is defined by ambiguous 
boundaries—the WFP chooses who is ‘worthy’ of aid, especially as budget cuts force it 
to choose recipients strategically. Through these and other daily routines of relief 
distribution, humanitarian organizations participate in the production of “mobile 
sovereignties”73 lived spaces where various actors contribute to the suspension of law and 
the organization of political authority.
74
  This concept helps capture how the dynamic, 
fluid political relationships between humanitarians, military forces and local populations 
in Syria has relativized political authority and reshaped the capacities of those who 
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participate in its production.
75
 This is not to say that humanitarian organizations are 
entirely oblivious to aid’s impact. Serious actors do consider the political, social and 
economic repercussions of their efforts on the local environment, and there are an array 
of approaches to implementing the humanitarian principles and navigating the pragmatic 
concerns that drive their interventions. However, it is the very fact that these 
organizations are the principle decision-makers in managing certain populations and 
deciding who lives and dies—swayed as they may be by international law, on-the-ground 
constraints and individual organizational mandates—that gives them elements of 
sovereign power. Their participation in the fragmentation of authority and the 
reproduction of sovereign politics remains frequently overlooked. 
Aid’s envelopment in sovereign power relations is well borne-out by two 
interviews conducted on the same day in October 2014. We asked two Syrian aid workers 
about the presence of aid organizations in their respective neighborhoods. The first 
worker, who lives in a regime-controlled area of Damascus, stated that, “Yes, there is the 
World Food Programme, Red Cross and Red Crescent, they distribute bags of food every 
two months or so.” The second interviewee, a volunteer living in the Zamalka 
neighborhood in the opposition-controlled East Ghouta suburb of Damascus indicated 
that, “the blockade does not allow any aid organizations to enter, there are none in East 
Ghouta. The same applies to aid convoys.” Undoubtedly, decisions over aid deliveries are 
intimately shaped by questions of access, safety and logistics, yet neutrality veils the very 
political process of decision-making, which instead becomes a question of bureaucratic 
and administrative micro-verdicts. Through their consistent participation in these 
decisions—that is, when aid agencies choose between helping a poor Syrian under 
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regime control or saving a starving one in opposition held territory—humanitarian 
organizations hold the power to make life-and-death decisions usually left to institutions 
with explicitly sovereign attributes.
76
 Undoubtedly, aid agencies are hindered by legal 
norms, government and opposition restrictions and military battles when making these 
choices; nonetheless, they do participate in a struggle over the state of exception on a 
recurring basis.   
Humanitarian organizations’ relationship with sovereignty is thus extremely 
complex. In Syria, they reaffirm and reshape sovereign power even while engaging in 
similar—some would say parallel—activities.77 Rather than seeing sovereignty 
statically—as something possessed or not, spatially bound or absolute—the Syrian case 
illuminates the fluidity of power relations. To understand such formations, close attention 
should be given not to absolute juridical claims or international norms but on the 
contingencies and contexts that emerge during war. Who holds the capacity to declare the 
exception? How does aid re-configure power relations between ruler and ruled? When do 
these processes occur and what do they entail? These are all questions humanitarian 
organizations should ask, but which the neutrality frame helps preclude. Equally 
important is how neutrality contributes to aid’s entanglement in crucial political and 
military dynamics. 
Emergency Food Aid’s Political and Military Impact  
Emergency food aid has unintentionally assisted the Assad regime in a number of 
intersecting ways. By channeling most assistance through SARC and other government-
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approved organizations, emergency food aid has helped the regime fulfill some of its 
welfare responsibilities. The wartime government can neglect food distributions and 
other provisionary duties previously at the heart of its pre-war social pact with Syrian 
society, instead focusing funds on military efforts. Some critics have been dismayed by 
the UN’s unwillingness to use the leverage this offers. David Miliband, a former British 
Foreign Secretary and current head of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), has 
argued that, “the Assad regime can’t afford to kick the UN out of Damascus. The UN is 
feeding so many of [Assad’s] own people.”78 All too frequently, emergency food aid has 
contributed to the regime’s capacity to exercise power over resources and people. This 
helps the Assad regime maintain a semblance of the pre-war social contract and assuages 
popular unrest that may have emerged otherwise. This prospect was made evident in 
violent protests objecting to fuel, food and electricity shortages in the regime-controlled 
city of Latakia in late 2014.
79
  
A steady supply of humanitarian relief has also helped regime-controlled areas 
project an image of comparative security. In war-stricken Syria, this has increased the 
attractiveness of government rule. Although initial internal displacements were linked to 
violence and insecurity, increasing poverty and devastation has meant that migration has 
become increasingly needs-driven. Hundreds of thousands of Syrian IDPs have fled from 
contested or rebel-held areas to the regime-controlled cities of Latakia and Tartous to 
ensure their survival, regardless of ideology or political orientation. The number of IDPs 
in the country—7.6 million by mid-2015, not including those not officially recognized by 
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the Syrian government—has dramatically altered the composition of local populations.  
“The Syrian regime prevents the Red Crescent from working in liberated [rebel-
controlled] areas or those outside of its control,” said Moatez Hazm, an IRC worker in 
Daraa. “The Red Crescent in Daraa … cannot give out any aid because it only works with 
the Syrian regime.”80 Government-controlled Tartous, in contrast, has a sophisticated 
network of aid distribution that helps IDPs fleeing from Homs, Hama and Aleppo. “Ever 
since the huge waves of displaced came from Aleppo, official institutions have become 
involved in providing aid,” said one humanitarian worker in the city.81 Both Syrian state 
news and the WFP used aid distribution in Tartous to publicize the ostensibly apolitical 
relief efforts, despite the unbalanced nature of the greater distribution process.
82
 Although 
certain opposition groups have been assisted by smaller organizations working to deliver 
supplies across the Turkish border, far larger amounts of ostensibly neutral aid have been 
repeatedly co-opted by government forces.
83
 Rebel groups unable to feed those under 
their control have seen their legitimacy eroded, a primary concern given their dependence 
on popular support, or at least acquiescence. Of course, aid organizations are keen to 
emphasize that their work is driven not by political considerations, but by human need. 
This logic appeals to the universal morality at the center of contemporary humanitarian 
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aid efforts, which “holds the preservation of life to be above and distinct from any 
political aims.”84 Yet such principles obscure far more than they illuminate.  
The political impact of hunger in rebel-held territories has been evident 
throughout the conflict. Areas under military siege or opposition rule have been thrown 
into chaos on account of their lack of access to essential foodstuffs.
85
 By advancing this 
outcome, the regime destroys the fabric of society by disordering areas outside of its 
control. In the East Ghouta suburbs of Damascus, internal rebel dynamics changed 
dramatically after regime forces cut off the last supplies into Douma, the de facto rebel 
headquarters in the area in late 2014. The regime prevented all food, fuel, aid and 
medicine from entering Douma. Prices of basic necessities skyrocketed immediately, 
forcing families to reduce their daily food intake.
86
 The rapidly declining human 
conditions in the town caused residents to protest, demanding accountability from local 
military groups—Jaish al-Islam and Jaish al-Umma—and discrediting their claims to 
authority in the process. 
 As Douma’s infrastructure collapsed and the humanitarian 
situation became more desperate, neighborhoods just kilometers away benefited from 
humanitarian aid. “Food is available [even if] prices are very high,” said one activist in 
regime-controlled Damascus during the siege of Douma.
87
 Through its absence in Douma 
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and its availability in nearby neighborhoods, emergency food aid reconfigured local 
political loyalties and modalities of governance.  
Elsewhere in southern Damascus, three formerly pro-opposition towns—Babila, 
Beit Sahem and Yelda—agreed to truces with the regime in 2014. These followed months 
of besiegement by the Syrian army, during which an estimated 200 residents died due to 
malnutrition, starvation and a lack of adequate medical supplies. “The truces lifted a huge 
burden from the peoples’ shoulders,” stated one anonymous activist from Beit Sahem, 
“People don’t have to worry about starvation anymore.”88 After the truce was agreed, 
SARC immediately delivered aid to the three towns and has continued to do so since. By 
allowing aid distributions, the regime shares credit for welfare provision without 
diverting resources from its military efforts. It is also able to cajole civilians into 
maligning its opponents. Following the arrival of aid, residents of Beit Sahem staged a 
series of daily demonstrations against the remaining Jabhat al-Nusra fighters in the town, 
who had been a prominent part of the local rebel brigade prior to the truce. Inhabitants 
demanded that combatants leave the area immediately for fear of breaking the armistice 
that permitted the arrival of aid.
89
 “There is a sense of happiness,” another citizen-
journalist in Beit Sahem said in January 2015, referring to the state of the town after the 
Nusra fighters reportedly exited.
90
 In southern Damascus, acquiescence, if not loyalty, 
was built on the back of humanitarian assistance.  
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Emergency food aid has also altered the war economy and political dynamics in 
favor of those in power. An array of military forces have profited from relief efforts that 
seek to distribute aid to needy residents, as they have positioned themselves between 
humanitarian organizations and the local population so to mediate the relationship to their 
advantage. Supplies intended for noncombatant populations have frequently been re-
allocated to military forces. One Mercy Corps employee relayed that Islamic State (IS) 
forces in the eastern Aleppo countryside “demanded to supervise the distribution 
process” and requested “a 30% share of aid supplies to distribute as it wished.”91 In 
Raqqa, aid groups operating in the region in late 2014 had to work with IS in order to 
assist civilians in the province. As one local activist explained, “Any aid that enters into 
Raqqa has to receive a paper of approval from the IS Office of Relief in order to secure 
the passage in and out of the region without IS confiscating the aid … The aid is 
registered at an IS office and then exits under the office’s supervision.”92 In early 2015, 
IS confiscated WFP aid intended for civilians, either taking it through informal taxation 
or warehouse raids before distributing the goods under its own name. The IS media team 
circulated photographs of one instance during which its fighters distributed WFP food 
parcels with the Islamist group’s logo stamped over the UN’s, making explicit the 
process through which neutral humanitarian aid becomes politicized local welfare.
93
  
Emergency food aid has directed the energy of militants and politicians towards 
external sources of material assistance, rather than towards problems felt by the 
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governed. In Douma, for instance, Jaish al-Islam collaborated with traders to hoard food 
aid and other supplies acquired from humanitarian groups rather than distribute it to 
besieged civilians.  “They refuse to sell any items before meeting the needs of fighters,” 
said one activist who, along with other Douma residents, protested against the traders’ 
monopoly.
94
 Drawing on resources made available by emergency food aid, Jaish al-Islam 
could ignore public demands for accountability and assert itself unilaterally in the city. 
This dynamic alters patterns of accountability so that rulers can override domestic 
pressures. While ties to aid organizations and foreign allies have given Syrian 
opposition groups and the Assad regime access to much needed material 
assistance,
95
 it has repeatedly inhibited the emergence and establishment of more 
inclusive and comprehensive welfare systems. Failure to provide basic goods to local 
residents in various stages of the Syrian war has undermined public support for various 
fighting forces.
96
 Given the presence of external resources, military groups had little 
incentive to expand their distributive apparatus. Without such assistance, the regime and 
certain rebel groups may have been forced to gather and provide resources locally.
97
 The 
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benevolent ethos of emergency food aid, and the neutrality that underpins distribution, 
obscures the practical ways in which outside assistance can help undermine or erode the 
rights, responsibilities and conventions between rulers and ruled. While emergency aid 
can appear apolitical on the surface, food’s varied but undeniable importance during 
wartime makes neutrality untenable. By bringing external resources into life-or-death 
situations characterized by scarcity, aid agencies inevitably become implicated in war’s 
inner workings. The results are not necessarily negative, nor need they be. Humanitarian 
aid can be emancipatory or deeply regressive depending on the political configurations in 
which it is located.
98
 But these decisions should be discussed and debated—something 
the neutrality frame does not allow. 
Conclusion  
Few studies have examined how emergency food aid influences sovereignty and 
politics during conflict. In this article, we have undertaken a first attempt at assessing 
these relationships through close scrutiny of the Syrian case. We have attempted to 
demonstrate how the importance of subsidized food to Syria’s pre-war welfare practices 
coupled with the rapid increase in food insecurity since the onset of the country’s current 
conflict make food highly political. Yet, for the aid organizations operating in Syria, 
providing food is not a historically contingent or context specific political endeavor, but a 
neutral intervention premised on humanitarian ethics they implicitly expect others to 
share. Relief organizations whose operations are shaped by this frame defend their ability 
to distribute aid to both regime and opposition-controlled areas, even if the allocation is 
unequal. By claiming that they make conscious efforts to be unbiased in their 
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distribution—“reaching anyone who needs it, regardless of where they are located”— 
they imply that their intentions can at least partially exempt them from the actual results 
of food distribution.
99
 When they frame their interventions in terms of neutrality, 
emergency food distributions attempt to carve out a sphere for their work separate from 
politics, even as those on the ground contest their claims based on actual results. We have 
tried to show the various problems that emerge as a result.  
What, ultimately, does the ascendance of the neutrality frame mean, both for 
Syria and the emergency food aid enterprise more broadly? Whether emergency food 
relief distributed in Syria demonstrates a return to older forms of neutral assistance, the 
full-fledged transformation of humanitarianism into a vanguard form of transnational 
politics,
100
 or is merely another instance of aid functioning to “contain” surplus 
populations in the Third World,
101
 is a difficult question.  Humanitarian morality—and 
the neutrality frame it helps justify—does seem to be a (re)emergent form in the 
legitimization of aid operations. For Fassin, politics in both peace and war is being 
redefined—the ascendance of humanitarian morality involves a “new repertoire for 
public action… that reformulates what is at stake in politics.”102 For others, emergency 
food aid in Syria probably confirms humanitarian organizations’ role in a global 
counterinsurgency strategy, in which relief functions as a “merely discretionary 
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international protection of last resort” meant to contain the destabilizing effects of war 
and underdevelopment.
103
 For the moment, the words and deeds of humanitarian 
organizations and their donors appear to evince a bit of both analyses. Interestingly, both 
assessments coincide in their critique of neutrality. By creating a set of operational and 
moral rules that work as an abstraction from the messy world of history, politics and 
conflict, the frame of neutrality allows humanitarian organizations to disregard their 
complicity in war’s inner workings. By replacing a politics of rights and justice with one 
of suffering, compassion and technocratic proficiency, ostensibly neutral aid reinforces 
the inequality at the heart of sovereign power, reducing Syrians to their bare, biological 
lives. In categorically separating their actions from politics and power—a division that is 
embedded in the neutrality frame—humanitarian organizations operating in Syria erase 
the conflicts, disputes and shared understandings that shape a sovereign’s capacity to 
declare and enact a state of exception. Simultaneously, they contribute to “localized 
forms of sovereignty,” which are in turn “nested” within “higher sovereignties,” so that 
sovereign power relations are found in multiple, layered and mobile forms.
104
 No matter 
how honorable the goals or the intentions of those who distribute it, emergency food aid 
is far from the altruistic panacea or neutral operation its proponents imagine it to be.  
We do not mean to argue that all emergency food aid should be unilaterally 
withdrawn. Humanitarian organizations do offer important services and have 
undoubtedly ameliorated suffering. Yet in the ethical claims they make on behalf of 
marginalized populations and through the practices they employ to assist those deemed 
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‘at risk,’ emergency food aid refashions sovereignty and reshapes politics in ways its 
proponents and distributors cannot see. What the long-term implications may be for 
Syria, and for emergency food aid as a humanitarian enterprise, remains an open 
question. The Syrian conflict is in many ways so idiosyncratic in its history, development 
and animating logics that we are hesitant to draw general conclusions.
105
 Yet what we can 
say with some certainty is that emergency food aid is not neutral, nor can it ever be. 
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Table 1. Syrian government pre-war spending on food subsidies 
and as percent of Syria’s total gross domestic product (GDP).  
Year 
GDP ($ 
billions) 
Spending on Food Subsidies 
$ millions % of GDP 
2008 $52.6 $1,470 2.8% 
2007 $40.4 $850 2.1% 
2006 $33.3 $666 2.0% 
2005 $28.9 $577 2.0% 
2004 $24.5 $515  2.1% 
2003 $20.9 $480  2.3% 
Sources: 
Ronald Albers and Marga Peeters, ‘Food and energy prices, government subsidies and fiscal 
balances in south Mediterranean countries’, Economic Papers 437, February 2011, pp. 22; 
‘World Development Indicators: Syrian Arab Republic – GDP’, The World Bank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx, accessed 23 June 2015; Ivan 
Kushnir, ‘Gross Domestic Product in Syria’, World macroeconomic research, 
http://kushnirs.org/macroeconomics/gdp/gdp_syria.html#change , accessed 23 June 2015. Own 
calculations.  
 
Table 2. Food-related funding for Syria allocated by the Food 
Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC)* and World Food 
Program (WFP).  
Year 
Funding ($ millions) 
FSAC WFP 
2015     $183**     $147** 
2014 $604 $542 
2013 $451 $387 
2012 $111 $109 
*FSAC is the principle UN funder for the WFP, Food & Agricultural Organization (FAO) and 
NGO partners providing food security in Syria 
** Ongoing, as of May 20, 2015 
Sources: 
‘Strategic response plan(s): Syria response plan 2015,’ UN OCHA, 
http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R32sum_A1069___8_May_2015_(15_50).pdf, 
accessed 23 June 2015; ‘Strategic response plan(s): Syria response plan 2015,’ UN OCHA, 
http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R1_A1069___1505081550.pdf, accessed 23 June 2015.  
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